Arab Spring was a movement in which the people stood up against the tyrant leaders. It was a peaceful democratic .Arab Spring was mostly seen in the parts of the Middle East and Africa. Libya and Syria are one of the cases in which the people protested against their ruthless leaders. In 2011 Libyan Crisis, the members of the Security Councils approved the use of force against Muammar-al Gaddafi forces opposing nonconformists and anarchist rebels. However, on account of Syria which additionally started in 2011, the members of Security Councils endorsed no such authority to stop the brutality between Al-Assad and nonconformists.
Some agnostic have argued by saying that intervention was not justified because the intervention has been given that expressly alluded to as the responsibility to protect doctrine. Moreover, skeptics also stated that the intervention was not led to due to humanitarian motive nor its members to abide to the emerging responsibility to protect’ norm. Although, both Al-Assad and Gaddafi generated atrocities against innocent civilians, this essay will argue the reasons why the United Nations chose to intervene in Libya but not in Syria due to the following reasons: Gaddafi was a tyrant, and the intervention in Libya was urged by the desire to maintain international norm, including the responsibility to protect theory and humanitarian intent.
Furthermore, some Security Councils members have national interests in intervening in Libya because of the vast reserve of oilfields and also to stop the immigrants coming to Europe. Lastly, intervening in Libya was not challenging as Gaddafi had a weak relationship with his neighbours. First of all, Gaddafi was a threat, he ruled Libya with an iron fist, and he needed to be put down as he was using heavy weapons against innocent civilians. The struggle in Libya started in February 2011 as rebellion in opposition to the Libyan authorities with the regards of the Arab Spring. Gaddafi openly expresses stating that his army is coming today around evening time, and will indicate no kindness or sympathy for the individuals who fight. The Security Councils adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011. The Resolution 1970 denounce the violence in Libya, other than; it requested safe passage for humanitarian supplies, set up an arms embargo, and forced constrained travel on the Gaddafi regimes. China and Russia natural antipathy to such measures; this decision used to be staggering a robust display of solidarity and unravel. Fears had built up that Resolution 1970 had been uncovered as a boast; the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on 17 March which embargoes the forcing of a no-fly zone over Libya. The Resolution denounced the gross and systematic violation of human rights committed by the Libyan government and cautioned that these demonstrations might amount to a crime against humanity. The exciting fact about Resolution 1973 was that it was one of the fastest Resolutions passed by the members of the Security Council. Further, Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN noted that she could not review a period in ongoing memory when the Council has acted rapidly, so decisively and in unanimity on a squeezing matter of worldwide human rights. The US, the UK, and France (NATO take hold of the command later) led a military operation in Libya, and within 48 hours Gaddafi pro was crushed down and denoting a conclusion to Muammar al-Gaddafi rule in Libya. Secondly, for the Security Council, the humanitarian and human concerns were undoubtedly the essential thought process for intervention in Libya, but by all account, they were not the only ones. Security Council members had material interests in intervening Libya. According to the evidence available, there has been a suspicion that European interest in Libya was due to two main reasons, first was to secure immense oilfields of Libya. The second purpose was to stop the immigrant coming from Africa to Europe. The historian, Dirk Vandewalle states that after Libya independence in 1951 the two salient features that helped in the development of Libya have been oil, and the revenues its sale generated. Libyan oil was the one of the primary reason for Gaddafi’s warring foreign policy; removing Gaddafi and facilitating the ascension of a regime favourably disposed to the West would eliminate a threat and ensure the hilly prized reliable supply of Libyan oil. Another interest that Security Council members had was to stop the immigration coming from Africa to Europe. Looking at the UNHCR report it has been seen, shortly before military intervention, 300,000 people escape from Egypt, Tunisia, and neighbouring countries, many of whom were refugee working in Libya. As Patrick claimed that after all Libya is positioned on Europe’s platform, countries such as Italy and France were the one who was worried the most about the emigrant coming from Libya. Ramesh Thakur, one among the principal architect of responsibility to protect, for instance, concurred that in Libya, Wests vital interests agreed with the UN values. Looking at the evidence, it suggests that the Security Council members had material interests in Libya, especially in terms of refugees, were a particular interest that Council Member’s consent to use of military force in Libya. Thirdly, Gaddafi had a problematic relationship with different countries, and therefore, it made intervention easy. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy foreign policy had a solid passion for sending military power, as per a few records, as a technique for expressing French power inside the European Union. The French government was moreover restless to build up its military collaboration with Britain and to see Europeans led the pack as opposed to following the Americans into yet one more campaign. This view was not, in any case, shared by the other European government who were progressively keen on observing NATO a more prominent role. Given the dimension of help among Arab states, particularly in the earlier phases of the intervention, French worries over NATO’s inclusion did not emerge. The US turned out to be fully engaged once France and Britain’s support was obviously exhibited and a choice was made to look for a UN goal to approve the mediations. From the minute, Obama settled on the option to go for humanitarian intervention, US political machinery went to overdrive, with dangerous reaches US strategy went into overdrive at the UN and phone tact to crucial capitals. This was especially critical in Russia, just as with South Africa, who were convinced to cast a ballot for the Resolution. In conclusion, the paper examines the reasons behind the intervention in Libya. Firstly, we see that the intervention was carried out by the United Nations members because it was a moral duty to protect the civilians from the tyrant Gaddafi. Second of all, Security Council members had specific interests in intervening Libya due to secure access to oilfields and stop the flow of migrants. Thirdly, it was easy to intervene in Libya compared to its neighbouring states because Gaddafi’s relationship with other countries was not significant. Thomas G. Weiss, states that it certainly was not the content of the R2P norm that explained the action in Libya and inaction in Syria but, rather, geopolitics and collective spineless. Thus, this essay shows the reasons why the United Nations chose to intervene in Libya, but not in Syria